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Sophistical Rhetoric
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I. Introduction
In Lawrence v. Texas,1 the United States Supreme Court struck down Texas’s
sodomy law. The majority was careful to make clear that it was not deciding whether the
right to marry a same sex partner was constitutionally protected, instead focusing on the
criminal aspects of the prohibition at issue. Justice Scalia implied in dissent that the
Court had abandoned principled constitutional interpretation and might well eventually
recognize the right of same-sex couples to marry. While it is not at all clear that the
Court will recognize such a right, it is worth noting that the right of same-sex couples to
marry followed from the existing right-to-marry jurisprudence even before Lawrence was
decided. Lawrence is important, not because it recognized a right to same-sex marriage,
but because it overruled a decision which had falsely been thought to be a bar to the right
to marry a same-sex partner. This Article will examine Lawrence in light of McLaughlin
v. Florida,2 Loving v. Virginia,3 and the right to marry jurisprudence more generally,
concluding that Lawrence makes even clearer that same-sex marriage is protected by the
United States Constitution, even if the current Court is unlikely to recognize that.
Part II of this Article will examine Lawrence, contrasting it with Bowers v.
Hardwick,4 and discussing what Lawrence says and does not say about the right to marry
a same-sex partner. Pat III discusses the equal protection and due process issues
implicated by same-sex marriage bans, suggesting that such prohibitions should be struck
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down on both due process and equal protection grounds. The Article concludes by
suggesting that Lawrence is important for a variety of reasons, not least of which is the
rather startling admission by the dissent that the current constitutional jurisprudence
requires the recognition of same-sex marriages. Admission notwithstanding, however, it
is at best unclear whether this Court will recognize what the Constitution requires in this
regard or whether, instead, that recognition will not take place until sometime in the
perhaps distant future.

II. Lawrence v. Texas
In Lawrence v. Texas,5 the Court examined a statute that criminalized intimate,
same-sex conduct.6 The statute was challenged as a violation of both equal protection
and due process guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution,7 and the Court struck it down as a violation of the latter.8 The decision is
likely to be viewed as a watershed in the movement to secure equal rights for the lesbian,
gay, bisexual, and transgendered (LGBT) community, although commentators will long
disagree about what the decision means and why it is important.
A. Lawrence as Response to Bowers v. Hardwick
One way to understand Lawrence v. Texas is to see it as a response to Bowers v.
Hardwick9 both substantively and symbolically. Lawrence removes some of the
underpinnings provided by Hardwick upon which discrimination against the LGBT
community has been rationalized. At the same time, it recognizes the dignity of same-sex
relationships and offers hope that the LGBT community will someday enjoy the same
rights that others in the United States enjoy.
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At issue in Lawrence was Tex. Penal Code Ann. Sec. 21.06(a), which prohibited
sexual intercourse between individuals of the same sex involving contact between the
genitals of one person and the mouth or anus of another or the penetration of the genitals
or the anus of another person with an object.10 The state did not criminalize the same
activity if performed by members of different sexes.11 Not surprisingly, the statute was
challenged on both equal protection and due process grounds.12
While the Court ultimately struck down the statute as a violation of Fourteenth
Amendment due process guarantees,13 the Court seemed to take the equal protection
challenge seriously as well, describing that argument as “tenable.”14 However, the Court
believed it very important to address Bowers v. Hardwick15 directly,16 since “[i]ts
continuance as precedent demeans the lives of homosexual persons.”17
At issue in Bowers was a Georgia statute which prohibited sexual acts involving
the sex organs of one person and the mouth or anus of another.18 The statute did not
distinguish based on the sexes of the parties involved or on their marital status.19 Indeed,
the statue was initially challenged by a married couple as well as by Hardwick,20
although the couple was dismissed for lack of standing.21
The statute was challenged as a violation of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.22 The Bowers Court understood that an existing line of cases
protected the right of privacy23 and, further, thatsome of the right of privacy cases
recognized rights that “have little or no textual support in the constitutional language.”24
The Court claimed, however, that it could “identify the nature of the rights qualifying for
heightened judicial protection,”25 namely, those “liberties that are ‘implicit in the concept
of ordered liberty,’ such that ‘neither liberty not justice would exist if [they] were
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sacrificed,’”26 or “those liberties that are ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and
tradition.’”27 The Court concluded that because “neither of these formulations would
extend a fundamental right to homosexuals to engage in acts of consensual sodomy,” 28
the right to privacy obviously did not include the right to engage in same-sex relations.
Yet, the Courtfailed to point out that those rig hts already recognized as falling
within the right to privacy also would not have met the test articulated by the Court. For
example, the statute at issue in Griswold v. Connecticut,29 which prohibited using “any
drug, medicinal article or instrument for the purpose of preventing contraception,”30 had
been on the books for over eighty years, 31 and thus the right to use contraception could
not plausibly have been described as either implicit in the concept of ordered liberty or
deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition. The statute prohibiting abortion at
issue in Roe v. Wade32 was typical of statutes that had been on the books for a century33
and thus the right to abort could hardly be thought deeply rooted in the Nation’s history
and tradition.34 The point here is not to suggest that Griswold and Roe were wrongly
decided but merely to suggest that the Court offered the wrong test in Bowers for
determining whether something falls within the right to privacy.
The Bowers Court at least implicitly offered another test for determining whether
a particular liberty falls within the right to privacy, construing the protected zone as
involving family-related decisions and then suggesting, “No connection between family,
marriage or procreation on the one hand and homosexual activity on the other has been
demonstrated.”35 The Lawrence Court accepted that family-related decisions are within
that protected zone, reaffirming that “our laws and tradition afford constitutional
protection to personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family
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relationships, child rearing and education.”36 However, the Lawrence Court differed
from the Bowers Court in that the former but not the latter recognized that those with a
same-sex orientation can and do have relationships worthy of protection. Indeed, the
Lawrence Court criticized the Bowers Court by noting that the latter had
mischaracterized the relevant issue—“To say that the issue in Bowers was simply the
right to engage in certain sexual conduct demeans the claim the individual put forward,
just as it would demean a married couple were it to be said marriage is simply about the
right to have sexual intercourse.”37 The Lawrence Court noted that “[w]hen sexuality
finds overt expression in intimate conduct with another person, the conduct can be but
one element in a personal bond that is more enduring,”38 thereby recognizing that those
with a same-sex orientation like those with a different-sex orientation may not merely
perform isolated sexual acts but, in addition, have relationships and find meaning,
purpose, and dignity in those relationships.39
The Lawrence Court outlined some of the pernicious effects of Bowers,
explaining that “[w]hen homosexual conduct is made criminal by the law of the State,
that declaration in and of itself is an invitation to subject homosexual persons to
discrimination both in the public and in the private spheres.”40 Indeed, the state of Texas
had itself “previously acknowledged the collateral effects of the law, stipulating . . . that
the law ‘legally sanctions discrimination against [homosexuals] in a variety of ways
unrelated to the criminal law,’ including in the areas of ‘employment, family issues, and
housing.’”41 As an additional point, the Court noted some of the direct effects of a
conviction under the statute at issue, which were not trivial by any means.42 For
example, as Justice O’Connor noted in her concurring opinion, a conviction would
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restrict the ability of an individual to pursue various professions in Texas and might
require that individual to register as a sex offender were he or she to move to another
state.43
In overruling Bowers, the Lawrence Court prevents the imposition of some of the
harms outlined above and undermines the purported justification for others. Thus, not
only is there no longer the possibility of a conviction in circumstances like these, but
those who argue that discrimination against the LGBT community is somehow justified
because of the permissibility of criminalizing sodomitical relations must now offer
another ground upon which to rationalize their desired discrimination.
A separate but related point is that individuals who wish to deny equal rights to
members of the LGBT community will no longer be able to point to the Court’s tone
when addressing orientation issues as support for denying equal rights.44 Thus, some of
the harm caused by Bowers was not its substantive holding but its tone, which might
felicitously be described as having been contemptuous towards those with a same-sex
orientation.45 The Lawrence Court was respectful rather than contemptuous,
acknowledging that “adults may choose to enter upon this [same-sex] relationship in the
confines of their homes and their own private lives and still retain their dignity as free
persons.”46 While hardly offering a full-fledged endorsement, the Court nonetheless
accords a kind of respectability to LGBT people and relationships that had not been
accorded in previous decisions.
The Lawrence Court addressed the concern that sodomitical behavior is viewed
by some as violating religious and moral principles, discussing “powerful voices . . .
[that] condemn homosexual conduct as immoral.”47 The Court understood that such
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views were “shaped by religious beliefs, conceptions of right and acceptable behavior,
and respect for traditional family,”48 but noted that “the issue is whether the majority may
use the power of the State to enforce these views on the whole society through operation
of the criminal law.”49 Concluding that the majority may not, the Court struck down the
statute.50
Of course, Lawrence has implications for those not in the LGBT community as
well. By holding that the activity at issue was protected by the Due Process Clause, the
Lawrence Court is presumably invalidating any fornication statues remaining on the
books.51 A separate question is whether statutes prohibiting adultery or prostitution are
also at risk,52 although the majority made clear that the case before it did not involve
prostitution,53 and offered language suggesting how the case before it might be
distinguished from one involving adultery.54 Thus, state statues regulating sexual conduct
may now have to undergo reexamination with some being quite vulnerable to
constitutional challenge but others being quite likely to withstand an attack on federal
constitutional grounds.
Further, a more general point might be made about how the Due Process Clause
may be construed in future. The Lawrence Court eschewed the Bowers history-andtraditions approach and instead suggested that “those who drew and ratified the Due
Process Clauses of the Fifth Amendment [and] the Fourteenth Amendment . . .
[understood that] times can blind us to certain truths and later generations can see that
laws once thought necessary and proper in fact serve only to oppress.”55 The Court
understood that this would mean that challenges which might once have been dismissed
out of hand by one generation might well be taken seriously by another, and noted that
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“[a]s the Constitution endures, persons in every generation can invoke its principles in
their own search for greater freedom.”56 Here, the Lawrence Court makes clear that it
rejects the static approach to due process guarantees sometimes advocated and leaves
open the possibility that a variety of liberties will be found protected which once would
have been described as appropriately subject to state regulation.
B. Lawrence and the Right to Marry a Same-Sex Partner
Commentators discussing whether the United States Constitution protects the
right of same-sex couples to marry will debate both whether and why Lawrence plays an
important role in that analysis. Certainly, Justice Scalia suggested in his Lawrence
dissent that the decision provides the basis for recognizing same-sex marriage,57 but there
are a number of reasons to doubt that the Court is ready to take this step.
Same-sex marriage is mentioned or alluded to in several places in Lawrence.58
However, nowhere in the opinion is there a suggestion that members of the Court believe
that such a right is protected by the United States Constitution and in several places there
are suggestions that some members of the Court do not believe that it is.
The majority opinion alludes to same-sex unions but refuses to express an opinion
about whether they are protected. For example, the Court noted that the Texas criminal
statute seeks to “control a personal relationship that, whether or not entitled to formal
recognition in the law, is within the liberty of persons to choose without being punished
as criminals.”59 Thus, some members of the Court may believe that the Constitution
precludes criminalizing voluntary, adult, same-sex relations but does not also require that
same-sex unions be given legal recognition. Certainly, this seems to be the view which
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Justice O’Connor now holds,60 and it is simply unclear how many other members of the
Court share that view.
The Lawrence majority offered a general rule that states should not attempt to set
boundaries to relationships “absent injury to a person or abuse of an institution the law
protects.”61 The Court did not make clear what it had in mind when discussing abuse of
an institution protected by the law. Perhaps the Court had marriage in mind and was
suggesting that adulterous relationships are not protected by the right to privacy because
they tend to undermine marriages.62 Or, perhaps the Court was suggesting that it believes
that recognizing same-sex marriage would involve an abuse of the institution of marriage,
notwithstanding that other countries permit such unions to be celebrated.63
The Lawrence Court made quite clear that the case before it did “not involve
whether the government must give formal recognition to any relationship that
homosexual persons seek to enter.”64 That said, however, the Court did offer some very
encouraging language in the opinion. For example, the Court noted that when
“homosexual conduct is made criminal by the law of the State, that declaration in and of
itself is an invitation to subject homosexual persons to discrimination both in the public
and in the private spheres.”65 Yet, the same point might be made about refusing to
recognize same-sex marriages—such a policy is an invitation to discriminate because it
says that such couples are somehow unworthy. Indeed, if, as the Court has suggested in
Romer v. Evans,66 an act is unconstitutional “when it classifies homosexuals not to
further a proper legislative end but to make them unequal to everyone else,”67 and, as
Justice Scalia suggests in his Lawrence dissent, “‘preserving the traditional institution of
marriage’ is just a kinder way of describing the State’s moral disapproval of same-sex
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couples,” then one might expect the Court to recognize the unconstitutionality of samesex marriage bans.
In criticizing Bowers, the Lawrence Court noted that the “longstanding criminal
prohibition of homosexual sodomy upon which the Bowers decision placed such reliance
is as consistent with a general condemnation of nonprocreative sex as it is with an
established tradition of prosecuting acts because of their homosexual character.”68 The
Court thereby tried to undercut the suggestion that the law had traditionally intentionally
and specifically imposed unique disabilities on the LGBT community, although it might
nonetheless be said that laws that were aimed at nonprocreative acts generally have been
used to justify the imposition of special burdens on those with a same-sex orientation.
For example, the law at issue in Bowers was not aimed at those with a same-sex
orientation in particular69 but its having been upheld was claimed by some to justify
imposing unique disabilities on the LGBT community.70
It is worth noting that an analogous approach has been used to justify same-sex
marriage bans. Thus, the inability of same-sex couples to have a child has been cited as a
reason not to allow them to marry,71 even though others unable to have children are not
similarly precluded from marrying.
Lawrence suggests that the Court will look askance at state attempts to impose a
disability on one group and not another if the groups are similarly situated. As Justice
Scalia suggests, the nonprocreation argument is not a plausible rationale for precluding
same-sex couples from marrying, given that the sterile and elderly are allowed to marry.72
Indeed, it is even more implausible than Justice Scalia seems willing to admit. Given that
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LGBT couples are having and raising children,73 the procreation argument supports rather
than undermines that same-sex couples should be allowed to marry.
In any event, Lawrence cannot be cited for the proposition that same-sex marriage
is protected by the United States Constitution. While some of the language of the opinion
is promising, the members of the Court have been careful either to express no opinion or
to suggest that there is no constitutional right to marry a same -sex partner. It may be
helpful, then, to see whether a case can be made for a constitutionally protected right to
marry a same-sex partner, given that Lawrence leaves the question open rather than
decides the issue.

III. Same-Sex Marriage and the Fourteenth Amendment
The right to marry jurisprudence has been evolving since the Court in Loving v.
Virginia74 described it as “one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit
of happiness by free men.”75 The Court has recognized the right’s importance, both for
society as a whole and for the individuals themselves. At least one question, then, is
whether the individual and societal interests served by different-sex marriages would also
be served by same-sex marriages.
A. Setting the Stage for Loving
One of the most important marriage decisions was Loving v. Virginia76 in which
the Court struck down Virginia’s antimiscegenation laws. The Loving Court suggested
that the laws at issue violated both equal protection77 and due process guarantees.78 Yet,
a mere three years earlier in McLaughlin v. Florida,79 the Courthad been unwilling to
express an opinion about the constitutionality of interracial marriage bans.
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In McLaughlin, the Court examined a Florida statute making interracial
fornication and adultery a separate crime.80 The state justified its law as an attempt to
“prevent breaches of the basic concept of sexual decency.”81 The Court did not quarrel
with the state’s contention that it had a legitimate interest in preventing “illicit
extramarital and premarital promiscuity,”82 but suggested that the state’s purposes could
be served by statutes of “general application.”83
The state of Florida offered another justification for the statute, however,
pointing to its interracial marriage ban and arguing that its interracial cohabitation law
was “ancillary to and serv[ing] the same purpose as the miscegenation law itself.”84 The
Court rejected this argument “without reaching the question of the validity of the State’s
prohibition against interracial marriage.”85 The Court noted that “even if we posit the
constitutionality of the ban against marriage of a Negro and a white, it does not follow
that the cohabitation law is not to be subjected to independent examination under the
Fourteenth Amendment.”86 The Court subjected the cohabitation law to this independent
examination and found it constitutionally wanting.
In McLaughlin, the Court did not strike down cohabitation laws generally but
only those that were specifically directed at interracial couples. In Lawrence, the Court
did not only strike down laws criminalizing same-sex sodomy, but struck down all
sodomy laws.87 It is simply unclear whether the Court will someday follow Lawrence
with a decision striking same-sex marriage prohibitions as the Court followed
McLaughlin with Loving.
B. The Right to Privacy
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In Lawrence, the Court suggested that Griswold v. Connecticut88 was “the most
pertinent beginning point”89 for an analysis of the constitutionality of Texas’s sodomy
law. The Lawrence Court noted that in Griswold a Connecticut law “prohibiting the use
of drugs or devices of contraception,” even by married couples, was struck down.90 The
Griswold Court had “described the protected interest as a right to privacy and placed
emphasis on the marriage relation and the protected space of the marital bedroom.”91 Of
course, relying on marital privacy would not seem to be of much help for those
challenging Texas’s sodomy statute, given that the statute only applied to non-marital
relations.92 However, the Lawrence Court suggested that “[a]fter Griswold, it was
established that the right to make certain decisions regarding sexual conduct extends
beyond the marital relationship.”93 The Court was apparently reading Eisenstadt v.
Baird94 as protecting not only the right of unmarried individuals to have access to
contraception but also to engage in sexual relations,95 at least if the individuals are adult
and their relations are consensual.96
Commentators may well express surprise that Justice Scalia did not focus more on
Justice Goldberg’s concurrence in Griswold in which he wrote that “it should be said of
the Court’s holding today that it in no way interferes with a State’s proper regulation of
sexual promiscuity or misconduct,”97 and in which he and two other members of the
Court98 cited Justice Harlan’s dissent in Poe v. Ullman99 with approval.100 In his Poe
dissent, Justice Harlan argued that the “right of privacy most manifestly is not an
absolute. Thus, I would not suggest that adultery, homosexuality, fornication and incest
are immune from criminal enquiry, however privately practiced.”101
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Yet, there may well be a reason that Justice Scalia did not focus on the Griswold
concurrence and Poe dissent, as may become clear when Justice Harlan’s analysis is
discussed more fully. Justice Harlan suggested that the
laws regarding marriage which provide both when the sexual powers may
be used and the legal and societal context in which children are born and
brought up, as well as laws forbidding adultery, fornication and
homosexual practices which express the negative of the proposition,
confining sexuality to lawful marriage, form a pattern so deeply pressed
into the substance of our social life that any Constitutional doctrine in this
area must build upon that basis. 102
Here, it is clear that Justice Harlan was envisioning a world in which same-sex
relations did not occur within the context of a family setting but, instead, outside of one.
Whether or not that was an accurate picture at the time, however, it certainly is not
currently, given how much the concept of family has expanded over the past several
decades. Same-sex couples are now living together as families.103 Sometimes they have
children that they are raising and sometimes they do not, but it simply is not true that
same-sex relations must take place outside of families rather than within them. If the
family setting is what is paradigmatic of what is protected by the Due Process Clause,
that LGBT families should also be protected.
A further point might be noted. Justice Harlan suggested that the constitutional
doctrine which provides bulwarks against state interference must begin with the family.
That does not suggest that the constitutional doctrine must end there. Rather, what is
suggested is that a prioritization has been offered. Family relationships must be protected
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even if sexual activity by those not within a family is not. However, that hardly means
that the latter cannot or should not also be protected.
The Lawrence Court noted, “When sexuality finds overt expression in intimate
conduct with another person, the conduct can be but one element in a personal bond that
is more enduring.”104 Here, the Court recognizes that same-sex relations may take place
within the context of a relationship, and implies that such relationships are included
within the family relationships that must be given protection under the Due Process
Clause.
In his Poe dissent, Justice Harlan distinguished between the State’s “power either
to forbid extra-marital sexuality altogether, or to say who may marry” and the State’s
power “when, having acknowledged a marriage and the intimacies inherent in it, it
undertakes to regulate by means of the criminal law the details of that intimacy.”105 Yet,
it is not as if the state has absolute discretion with respect to regulating who may marry
whom. As the Loving Court made clear a mere six years later, state marital restrictions
must not violate constitutional guarantees.
It might be thought that Loving does very little to limit the power of the states to
decide who can marry and that the states have free reign in this regard as long as they do
not classify on the basis of race. Such a view has not been borne out in the subsequent
jurisprudence.
In Zablocki v. Redhail,106 the Court examined a Wisconsin statute which
precluded certain Wisconsin residents from marrying without court permission.107 The
courts were directed not to permit noncustodial parents to marry unless they could show
that they were meeting and would continue to meet their child support obligations.108 The
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statute was challenged by Redhail, an indigent who wished to marry but who was unable
to pay court-ordered support for a child that he had fathered out of wedlock.109
The Zablocki Court noted that the “leading decision of this court on the right to
marry is Loving v. Virginia,”110 and explained, “Although Loving arose in the context of
racial discrimination, prior and subsequent decisions of this Court confirm that the right
to marry is of fundamental importance for all individuals.”111 The Court did not limit the
class for whom this right was so fundamental by excluding, e.g, those either unwilling or
unable to have children or those with a same-sex orientation, but said that it was
important for everyone. Indeed, Justice Powell in his Zablocki concurrence suggested
that the decision would have implications for those with a same-sex orientation.112
The Zablocki Court did not merely announce that the “right to marry is part of the
fundamental ‘right of privacy’ implicit in the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause,”113 but instead tried to explain why that was so by putting it in the context of
those rights which had already been recognized as falling within the right to privacy. The
Court noted, “It is not surprising that the decision to marry has been placed on the same
level of importance as decisions relating to procreation, childbirth, child rearing, and
family relationships,”114 since “it would make little sense to recognize a right of privacy
with respect to other matters of family life and not with respect to the decision to enter
the relationship that is the foundation of the family in our society.”115 While accepting
that Wisconsin had “legitimate and substantial interests” which were served by the
statute,116 the Court nonetheless struck down the statute because “the means selected by
the State for achieving these interests unnecessarily impinge on the right to marry.”117
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Zablocki would seem to be very persuasive if not dispositive in the context under
discussion here, given that LGBT couples are having and raising children. If, as Zablocki
suggests, it makes little sense to recognize a right of privacy with respect to other matters
of family life but not to marriage, then it makes no sense to refuse to recognize the right
of same-sex couples to marry.
In Adams v. Howerton,118 a federal district court addressed the validity of a samesex marriage between an American and an Australian national. In holding that the
marriage was invalid, the court discussed the equal protection challenge, given that
marriages were “sanctioned between couples who are sterile because of age or physical
infirmity, and between couples who make clear that they have chosen not to have
children.”119 The Adams court explained that “if the classification of the group who may
validly marry is overinclusive, it does not affect the validity of the classification.”120 Yet,
the court failed to understand that this is one of the reasons that same-same marriages
must be recognized regardless of whether a particular same-sex couple plans to have or
raise children. Even were it true that the sole reason to permit members of a class to
marry was to enable them to provide a more stable environment in which children might
be born and raised, that still would provide justification for recognizing same-sex
marriages. The fact that there are numerous reasons to recognize marriages, which are
equally applicable to same- and to different-sex couples, e.g., to make happier and more
productive citizens or to relieve financial burdens on the state, makes the equal protection
difficulties posed by same-sex marriage bans all the more glaring.
In Turner v. Safley,121 the Court discussed some of the constitutionally significant
interests implicated in marriage. Marriages are “expressions of emotional support and
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public commitment.”122 Further, “the commitment of marriage may be an exercise of
religious faith as well as an expression of personal dedication.”123 Finally, marriage
“often is a precondition to the receipt of government benefits.”124 Given that all of these
interests are also implicated for same-sex couples125 and the right to marry is of
fundamental importance for all individuals, the right to marry a same-sex partner should
be held to be constitutionally protected even bracketing Lawrence.
Lawrence does add something to the debate, however. If, as suggested in Bowers
and reaffirmed by Lawrence, the central focus of the substantive due process protections
involve family-related matters like marriage, having and raising children, etc., then one
would expect that if sexual relations for different-sex and same-sex couples are protected
even when occurring outside of the family context, then families involving same-sex
partners should certainly be protected. It may be that Justice Scalia did not want to point
to the prioritization which has been adopted by the Court precisely because this would
mean that the existing jurisprudence protects same-sex marriage, especially after
Lawrence. Thus, the claim would not be that same-sex marriage might be recognized
because the Court has given up all reasoning but that the Court’s previous jurisprudence
compels the legal recognition of such unions. Indeed, Justice Scalia admits as much
when he suggests that after Lawrence no distinction can “be made between heterosexual
and homosexual unions, insofar as formal recognition in marriage is concerned.”126
While Justice Scalia is correct that after Lawrence there is no constitutionally
viable distinction between the right to marry a same- versus a different-sex partner, he is
incorrect insofar as he is implying that there was a constitutionally viable distinction
before Lawrence.127 Even were the state permitted to criminalize sodomy outside of
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marriage, that would not imply that it could criminalize sodomy within marriage.128 Thus,
even were Bowers still good law, that would not imply that a same-sex couple who had
married could be prohibited from engaging in sexual relations. Nor would it mean that
the state could prevent same-sex couples from marrying to prevent them from engaging
in “criminal” sodomitical acts. Nonetheless, now that Bowers has been overruled, those
specious arguments are no longer even tempting to make.
C. Equal Protection
The argument above is focused on the substantive due process protections offered
by the Fourteenth Amendment. A separate question is whether same-sex marriage bans
violate equal protection guarantees. The comments offered by Justices O’Connor and
Scalia in Lawrence suggest that at least four members of the Court are unlikely to accept
the equal protection argument,129 although these comments also suggest that the Court is
going to have to modify its equal protection jurisprudence in order to avoid striking down
same-sex marriage bans on that basis.
Justice O’Connor made clear in her concurrence that she would have struck down
the Texas statue on equal protection rather than substantive due process grounds.130 She
suggests that rational basis review itself has tiers. Because “some objectives, such as ‘a
bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular group,’ are not legitimate state
interests,”131 the Court will apply “a more searching form of rational basis review to
strike down such laws under the Equal Protection Clause.”132 Because of this more
searching form of rational basis review, the Texas statute could not pass constitutional
muster.
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Justice O’Connor was unwilling to join the Court in overruling Bowers.133 She
suggested that the promotion of morality was a rational basis for law for substantive due
process purposes,134 even if not for equal protection purposes. She explained, “Moral
disapproval of this group [those with a same-sex orientation], like a bare desire to harm
the group, is an interest that is insufficient to satisfy the rational basis review under the
Equal Protection Clause.”135 She thus would have struck down the Texas statute but
would have reserved for another day whether the Due Process Clause precluded a neutral
sodomy law.136
Justice O’Connor recognized that the Texas sodomy statute criminalized conduct
and thus might be argued not to have been discriminating against persons.137 However,
she reasoned that the statute was “directed toward gay persons as a class”138 and thus was
unconstitutional.139 Justice O’Connor made clear, however, that she would view a
challenge to same-sex marriage statutes somewhat differently. She suggested that
“[u]nlike the moral disapproval of same-sex relations—the asserted state interest in this
case—other reasons exist to promote the institution of marriage beyond moral
disapproval of an excluded group.”140 Justice O’Connor failed to elaborate what those
reasons might be, and the question to be answered at some future time is whether, as
Justice Scalia suggests, “‘preserving the traditional institution of marriage’ is just a
kinder way of describing the State’s moral disapproval of same-sex couples.”141 If
Justice Scalia is correct, then it may well be very difficult indeed to provide any
legitimate rationale for same-sex marriage bans.
At least two points might be made about Justice O’Connor’s apparent willingness
to uphold same-sex marriage bans. First, the Wisconsin statute at issue in Zablocki was
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struck down on equal protection grounds.142 There, the state had legitimate and
substantial reasons for its statute,143 which nonetheless did not suffice to save it. The class
of individuals adversely affected by the statute—the indigent—was not suspect or quasisuspect.144 Thus, even if the state were to have a legitimate reason for its same-sex
marriage ban which was not simply the wish to express its moral disapproval of same-sex
couples, it is not at all cle ar that the reason would allow the statute to pass constitutional
muster, given the existing jurisprudence.
Second, it is not at all clear that rational basis would be the appropriate test when
examining this equal protection challenge. Justice Scalia’s comments in his Lawrence
dissent are suggestive of why this is so, especially once his misleading analysis of Loving
is explained and a more accurate analysis is considered in its stead.
Justice Scalia recognized in his Lawrence dissent that the Texas “statute does
distinguish between the sexes insofar as concerns the partner with whom the sexual acts
are performed: men can violate the law only with other men, and women only with other
women.”145 However, he concluded, “this cannot itself be a denial of equal protection,
since its is precisely the same distinction regarding partner that is drawn in state laws
prohibiting marriage with someone of the same sex while permitting marriage with
someone of the opposite sex.”146
Let us bracket his conclusion about whether the Texas statute passes muster under
the Equal Protection Clause, especially since a majority of the Court seems to believe that
it failed to pass muster even under the rational basis test.147 Let us also bracket his
conclusory statement about whether same-sex marriage bans pass constitutional muster,
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since that is the matter at issue, and examine why he believes that heightened scrutiny
would not be required when examining the constitutionality of such statutes.
Justice Scalia realizes that both the Texas sodomy statute and same-sex marriage
bans148 facially discriminate on the basis of sex, but argues that heightened scrutiny is not
necessary for either. He understands that the antimiscegenation laws at issue in Loving v.
Virginia149 would seem to be a clear counter-example to his analysis of whether same-sex
marriage bans trigger heightened scrutiny, since the lawsat issue in Loving “similarly
were applicable to whites and black alike, and only distinguished between the races
insofar as the partner was concerned.”150 However, he argues, the Court in Loving
“correctly applied heightened scrutiny, rather than the usual rational-basis review,
because the Virginia statute was ‘designed to maintain White Supremacy.’”151
Certainly, he is correct that the Loving Court found that the statutes at issue were
designed to promote White Supremacy.152 However, the important issues are whether
closer scrutiny was required to discover this invidious motivation and what would have
happened had there been no such finding.
Consider the analysis offered by the Court in City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson
Co.153 The Court explained, “Absent searching inquiry into . . . race-base measures, there
is simply no way of determining what classifications are ‘benign’ or ‘remedial’ and what
classifications are in fact motivated by illegitimate notions of racial inferiority or simple
racial politics.”154 While some members of the Court have argued convincingly that it is
sometimes possible to distinguish between benign and malicious discrimination,155 the
discrimination at issue in Loving and, for that matter, at issue in same-sex marriage bans
can hardly be characterized as benign and, in any event, one would not expect Justice
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Scalia to rely on the purpose of the discriminator when deciding whether exacting
scrutiny should be employed for a racial classification.156
Justice Scalia’s analysis is even more misleading because he mischaracterizes the
Loving decision itself. The Loving Court made clear that even had there been no purpose
to promote White Supremacy, the antimiscegenation statutes still would have been struck
down.157 Further, even had the Loving Court not expressed this explicitly, the
jurisprudence as it has since developed requires that “all racial classifications, imposed
by whatever federal, state, or local actor, must be analyzed by a reviewing court under
strict scrutiny.”158
The lesson of Loving is not that racial classifications will be examined closely
only when they are designed to promote White Supremacy, but that racial classifications
will be examined closely to root out invidious discrimination. Indeed, the Court had
already made that lesson clear. In McLaughlin v. Florida,159 there was no showing that
the state was trying to promote the superiority of one race over another, and the Court
nonetheless struck down the statute expressly classifying on the basis of race.160 The
McLaughlin Court made quite clear that “[j]udicial inquiry under the Equal Protection
Clause . . . does not end with a showing of equal application among the members of the
class defined by the legislation.”161 Rather, the “courts must reach and determine the
question whether the classifications drawn in a statute are reasonable in light of its
purpose.”162
The claim here is not that marriage statutes which expressly classify on the basis
of sex will be treated in the same way as will statutes that expressly classify on the basis
of race. The former classifications are subjected to a lower level of scrutiny than are the
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latter.163 Nonetheless, the claims are that sex-based classifications should not be
subjected to a rational basis test and that, as Justice Scalia suggests in his Lawrence
dissent, same-sex marriage bans involve sex-based classifications.
Perhaps the Court will ultimately find that same-sex marriage bans pass
constitutional muster. However, unless the Court is going to modify its current
jurisprudence,164 Justice Scalia is incorrect that a statute disadvantaging same-sex couples
which expressly classifies on the basis of sex does “not need to be justified by anything
more than a rational basis, which . . . is satisfied by the enforcement of traditional notions
of sexual morality.”165 Rather than pass the rational basis test, which merely requires that
the “classification drawn by the statute . . . [be] rationally related to a legitimate state
interest,”166 such a classification must “serve important government objectives and . . .
the discriminatory means employed . . . [must be] substantially related to the achievement
of those objectives.’” 167
To establish the constitutionality of a sex-based classification, it will not suffice
merely to establish that the classification was not motivated out of animus towards one
sex or the other. As the Court made clear in United States v. Virginia,168 “a party seeking
to uphold government action based on sex must establish an exceedingly persuasive
justification’ for the classification.”169 Indeed, the classification at issue in Virginia
which, arguably, was not motivated by animus,170 was nonetheless held not to pass
constitutional muster.171
It is unclear whether same-sex marriage bans could survive heightened scrutiny.
However, it might be noted that the Vermont Supreme Court in Baker v. State172 was
employing a scrutiny less exacting than heightened scrutiny173 and the Baker court
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nonetheless held that the state constitution’s analog of equal protection guarantees174 had
been violated by the state’s refusal to accord (qualifying) same-sex couples the benefits
accorded to married couples.175 It is at best unlikely that same-sex marriage bans could
withstand heightened scrutiny.
IV. Conclusion
In his Lawrence dissent, Justice Scalia suggests that the Lawrence opinion “‘does
not involve’ homosexual marriage only if one entertains the belief that principle and logic
have nothing to do with the decisions of this Court.”176 It is worth thinking about why
Justice Scalia believes that Lawrence “involves” same-sex marriage when the Texas
statute challenged was Tex. Penal Code Ann. Sec. 21.06(a)177 rather than Tex. Family
Code sec. 2.001.178
A. Lawrence and the Pre-existing Priorities in Due Process Jurisprudence
Lawrence is important to consider for a number of reasons. It strikes down
sodomy laws generally, which not only precludes states from criminalizing adult,
voluntary, same-sex relations but also has important implications if the Court is going to
adhere to the priorities that it has already articulated as being important in substantive due
process jurisprudence. The Court has already made clear that relationships are privileged
over relations and that family matters are at the core of what is protected by substantive
due process guarantees. If the right to engage in same-sex and different-sex non-marital
relations is protected, then certainly the right to have one’s family relationships not
impinged upon by the state is also protected, whether or not one is a member of the
LGBT community. This protection not only extends to one’s children but to one’s life
partner as well. If the previous jurisprudence is not suddenly going to undergo
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transformation, then Lawrence suggests that the right to marry a same-sex partner is
protected by substantive due process guarantees.
B. Lawrence as Representing an Evolution in Attitude
As a separate but related point, Lawrence represents a significant change in tone.
Romer v. Evans179 was an improvement over Bowers, because Romer struck down an
amendment which disfavorably classified those with a same-sex orientation “not to
further a proper legislative end but to make them unequal to everyone else.”180 The
Romer Court made clear that it “is not within our constitutional tradition to enact laws of
this sort.”181
Yet, Romer was ambiguous in that it was difficult to determine whether the
amendment was unconstitutional precisely because “its sheer breadth [was] so
discontinuous with the reasons offered for it that the amendment seem[ed] inexplicable
by anything but animus toward the class it affect[ed].”182 Were that the amendment’s
fatal flaw, then one might expect that the electorate could have achieved a similar result if
only it had been more patient and had adopted a piecemeal approach rather than tried to
do everything in one fell swoop.183 If that was all that Romer stood for, then it would not
be particularly supportive of the LGBT community except, perhaps, as a statement that it
is impermissible for the state to make members of the LGBT community into pariahs.184
Lawrence does not lend itself to the same kind of minimalist interpretation.
While the Court is mysterious about what it will say with respect to the constitutionality
of same-sex marriage bans, its tone of acceptance of and respect for members of the
LGBT community seems hard to mistake. That change in tone is important if only
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because it indicates that the Court no longer believes that LGBT individuals are secondclass citizens deserving less protection than other United States citizens.
C. Lawrence as Laying Bare the Invidiousness of Bowers
The Lawrence Court implied that Bowers had invidious effects.185 Yet, the
Lawrence dissent suggests something much stronger. Apparently, some members of the
Court have taken Bowers to hold as a matter of law that second-class status may be
imposed upon an entire group because of moral disapproval of that group. This casts a
whole new light on the majority and dissenting opinions in Bowers, Romer, and
Lawrence.
In his Bowers dissent, Justice Blackmun suggested, “Unlike the Court, the
Georgia Legislature has not proceeded on the assumption that homosexuals are so
different from other citizens that their lives may be controlled in ways that would not be
tolerated if it limited the choices of those other citizens.”186 One might have thought that
Justice Blackmun was engaging in rhetorical exaggeration. While the Bowers Court had
held that same-sex sodomydid not implicate a right deeply rooted in the Nation’s history
and tradition187 and hence was not protected by the Due Process Clause, the same
analysis applied equally to different-sex sodomy188 as well as adultery, fornication, and a
host of other activities.189 Thus, the decision, although disappointing and arguably
wrong, 190 need not have been doing anything invidious.
Certainly, lack of invidiousness does not excuse the Court’s having offered a
cramped191 and willfully blind192 reading of the case, the issue before it, and the past
jurisprudence, thereby having created an arbitrary limit on the reach of substantive due
process guarantees which undercut the Nation’s long-cherished values.193 Nonetheless,
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such a result, although deeply regrettable, is hardly the equivalent of a holding that those
with a same-sex orientation can be “singled out for disfavorable treatment.”194
Yet, Justice Blackmun may not have been engaging in rhetorical exuberance after
all. To see that, i t is important to considerRomer and then Lawrence.
Romer v. Evans195 might seem to be a surprising case to discuss when seeking to
get the “proper” interpretation of Bowers. At issuein Romer was an amendment to the
Colorado Constitution (Amendment 2) which precluded those with a same-sex
orientation from receiving protected status.196 The Colorado Supreme Court had struck
down the amendment on electoral process grounds,197 and the Romer Court affirmed but
on different grounds,198 namely, that the amendment violated equal protection
guarantees.199
Of interest here is not whether the amendment should have been struck down as a
violation of equal protection or, instead, electoral process guarantees200 but, rather, on
why Justice Scalia argued that the case “most relevant” to the issue before the Romer
Court was Bowers.201 After all, as Justice Scalia noted in his dissent, Colorado had
repealed its sodomy law.202 Yet, according to Justice Scalia, the fact of the repeal was
irrelevant, since if “it is constitutionally permissible for a State to make homosexual
conduct criminal, surely it is constitutionally permissible for a State to enact laws merely
disfavoring homosexual conduct.”203 What kind of laws? Those precluding the
extension of protected status or, presumably, those precluding marriage.204
To see how breathtaking this view is, consider adultery, a practice that is likely
not protected even after Lawrence.205 Consider further that, unlike its action with respect
to sodomy, the Colorado Legislature has not repealed its statute prohibiting adultery.206
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One would expect that Justice Scalia would suggest that heavy civil penalties could be
imposed on adulterers or even on those who had an adulterous “orientation,”207 e.g., those
married individuals who would kiss or embrace a non-spouse or, perhaps, who had a
“tendency or desire to do so.”208 An individual burdened by such a statute might bring an
as-applied challenge to establish that he or she had never engaged in adulterous behavior
but the statute itself, allegedly, would pass constitutional muster.209
Let us focus on a particular possible civil penalty, namely, not being able to
marry. Not so long ago, adulterers were precluded from marrying their paramours210 or,
sometimes, marrying at all.211 Yet, very few if any jurists and commentators in this day
and age would suggest that a state could constitutionally preclude adulterers, much less
those with an adulterous orientation, from remarrying. After all, the Zablocki Court
struck down the Wisconsin statute at issue precisely because it absolutely prevented some
from marrying and in effect coerced others into forgoing their right to marry.212 Yet,
Justice Scalia’s Romer and Bowers analyses would imply that adulterers could be
precluded from marrying or remarrying.
Suppose that we apply Justice Scalia’s approach to a different class of individuals,
namely, those who are fornicators or who have an “orientation” to fornicate. Presumably,
Justice Scalia would suggest that it is within the power of the state to preclude fornicators
from marrying. Those with such an orientation would be allowed to marry if successful
in their as-applied challenge, but the statute itself could withstand constitutional scrutiny.
Basically, this statute would impose possibly severe213 penalties on those unwilling to
delay having sexual relations until after marriage, and Justice Scalia would suggest that
such matters are best left to the wisdom of the Legislature.
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Consider how the Lawrence dissenters might address a case, Rablocki v. Zedhail,
involving facts similar to those of Zablocki. Justice Scalia would point out that Zedhail
had had a child out of wedlock.214 He would note that while Wisconsin does not have a
law against fornication per se,215 it could have such a law without offending the
Constitution, because fornication is neither implicit in the concept of ordered liberty nor a
right which is deeply rooted in the Nation’s history and tradition. Justice Scalia would
further point out that in Wisconsin the failure to pay child support can result in a felony
conviction.216 He would then suggest that if “it is constitutional to make . . . conduct
[involving nonsupport] criminal, then surely it is constitutionally permissible for a state
to enact other laws merely disfavoring . . . conduct [involving nonsupport].”217 He would
conclude that Wisconsin could preclude Redhail from marrying, past jurisprudence to the
contrary notwithstanding. Justice Rehnquist would either join Justice Scalia’s opinion or
would write a separate one suggesting that the right to marry is not the sort of right which
invariably triggers strict scrutiny.218 Justice Thomas might join either of those opinions
or, perhaps, write his own in which he not only rejected the fundamental right to marry
but that there is a general right to privacy.219
Needless to say, these views are not in accord with the current right-to-marry
jurisprudence. Certainly, that jurisprudence does not require the Courtto strike down any
and all restrictions on marriage. As the Court made clear in Zablocki, “reasonable
regulations that do not significantly interfere with decisions to enter into the marital
relationship may legitimately be imposed.”220 For example, in Sosna v. Iowa,221 the
Court upheld Iowa’s one-year residency requirement for divorce.222 However, that was
precisely because the statute at issue did not deprive the appellant of the right to marry
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but merely delayed its exercise.223 Here, we are postulating a complete deprivation of the
right to marry. The current jurisprudence simply does not permit the deprivation of that
right unless the statute at issue “is supported by sufficiently important state interests and
is closely tailored to effectuate only those interests.”224
There are two distinct issues which must not be conflated. One involves the
refusal of the Lawrence dissenters to accept or apply current privacy or right-to-marry
jurisprudence. Another involves their apparent belief that Bowers permits same-sex
marriage bans in particularbecause , allegedly, Bowers stands for the proposition that
those with a same-sex orientation can be singled out for disfavorable treatment,225
notwithstanding the explicit disavowal in Bowers that equal protection issues were even
being addressed.226
It should be little wonder that Justice Scalia suggested in his Romer dissent that
the amendment at issue was merely “a modest attempt by seemingly tolerant Coloradans
to preserve traditional sexual mores against the efforts of a politically powerful minority
to revise those mores through use of its laws.”227 On his view, Bowers made it
permissible for the states to impose any of a number of disabilities on members of the
LGBT community and Colorado had not chosen to exercise that power as fully as it
might have.
When the Romer Court suggested that a state cannot “deem a class of persons a
stranger to its laws,”228 it seems to have been rejecting a view that the Lawrence and
Romer dissenters actually hold, namely, that Bowers permits a kind of open season on
members of the LGBT community.229 The Romer and Lawrence dissenters should be
commended for their forthrightness. They do not merely suggest with a wink and a nod
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that a neutral law might slyly be applied in a way that would disadvantage a particular
group without running afoul of Yick Wo limitations.230 Rather the Romer dissent boldly
argues that Bowers permits members of the LGBT community to be singled out for
disfavorable treatment and the Lawrence dissent implies that discrimination against the
LGBT community in particular is legitimate and a constitutional right.231 Rather than
engaging in rhetorical exaggeration, the Bowers dissents and the Romer and Lawrence
majority decisions almost understate the view that they are opposing. If that opposing
view is not invidious, it seems difficult to imagine what would qualify.
D. Lawrence and Same-Sex Marriage
Even before Lawrence, the constitutionally significant interests established in the
right-to marry jurisprudence were equally applicable to same-sex and different-sex
couples. Both types of couples may have children to raise, and may consider marriage as
an expression of emotional support, public commitment, and religious faith. Some
commentators would explain the apparent anomaly in the failure to recognize the
unconstitutionality of same-sex marriage bans by talking about a “gay exception,”232
while others would simply claim that this is a refusal to accord same-sex couples “special
rights.”233 In his Lawrence dissent, Justice Scalia helps to settle that debate. Basically,
he suggests in his Romer dissent and, more explicitly, in his Lawrence dissent that samesex marriages are constitutionally protected, not if members of the LGBT community are
accorded special rights, but simply if they are accorded the same rights as everyone else.
Apparently, Justice Scalia’s complaint is that by overruling Bowers and thereby making
clear that the LGBT community cannot be singled out for disfavorable treatment, the
Lawrence Court makes it impossible to offer a constitutionally viable argument justifying
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same-sex marriage bans. Of course, neither the Lawrence majority nor the Lawrence
concurrence believe that the Constitution permits states to create the kind of second-class
citizenship which three members of the Court apparently believe would pass
constitutional muster, and it remains to be seen what implications, if any, this newly
announced equality will have.
The Lawrence majority recognized that “times can blind us to certain truths and
later generations can see that laws once thought necessary and proper in fact serve only to
oppress.”234 It is simply unclear whether the current Court can recognize what Justice
Scalia and two other members of the Court admit—the current equal protection and due
process jurisprudence require the recognition of same-sex marriage. We shall simply
have to wait and see how many generations of Supreme Court Justices are required
before the Court can see that same-sex marriage bans are neither necessary nor proper but
in fact serve only to oppress.
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